In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing secret sharing schemes without the assistance of a Dealer. We show how to implement Brickell's Vector space construction as a democratic secret sharing scheme. As a special case, we construct democratic threshold schemes by using Sharmir's method. In our democratic secret sharing schemes, the participants need no more information to be kept secret (shares) than they would need in the case where the schemes are constructed by a Dealer.
Introduction
Letp={P,,... , P,,} be a finite set of n participants and r be a set of subsets of c?.
A secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute partial information or shares to the participants in 9 in such a way that l any set of participants A E r can determine a secret s, l no subset of participants A'$T can do so.
The set r is called the access structure and the subsets in r are called authorized subsets. A secret sharing scheme is said to be "Perfect" if no subset of participants A'$T can determine any partial information regarding the secret s (in an information theoretic sense) even with infinite computational resources. Blakley [3] and Shamir
[ 151 introduced independently perfect (k, n) threshold secret sharing schemes in 1979.
A perfect (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme realizes a special access structure such that:
l any k participants can determine the secret s, l no subset of k -1 participants or less can determine any partial information regarding s.
Secret sharing schemes have received considerable attention in the last few years because of their many applications to several fields, such as data security, secure computation and others [ 111. For an extensive bibliography and illustration of the main results in the area, the reader is referred to [l&19] .
In secret sharing classical literature, all schemes depend, in their realization, on the existence of a Dealer whose function is, first, to choose the secret s and, then, to determine and distribute the shares to the participants in 8. Recently, various researchers have considered the possibility that the Dealer may attempt to cheat, distributing an inconsistent set of shares, so that the secret cannot be determined correctly or so that different subsets of participants in r would calculate different secrets from the shares they possess. Some papers that addressed the problem are ~1~2~71.
For many applications, no one can be trusted to know the secret. Therefore, Ingemarsson and Simmons [12] considered the problem of constructing secret sharing schemes without the assistance of a Dealer. For example, "Unanimous consent secret sharing scheme" [12] realizes an access structure r where the only subset of participants that can determine the secret s is the set of all the participants in 8. To implement a perfect unanimous consent secret sharing scheme, each of the participants in 9 could choose his share to be a random element of a finite field GF(q) with q elements, where q is a prime power (throughout the paper we refer such a field by GF(q)). The sum over GF(q) of the shares of the participants in S could be taken as the secret s of the scheme. Unanimous consent secret sharing schemes are well known schemes in literature [13, 19] and they have been used for several years to ensure unanimous consent before a controlled action can be initiated [17] . Unfortunately, unanimous consent secret sharing schemes are the only known example of schemes that can be implemented in such a way that the participants can define the secret s by a random choice of their shares. However, Ingemarsson and Simmons gave a protocol to construct secret sharing schemes realizing any access structures without the assistance of a Dealer. Briefly, in Ingemarsson and Simmons' protocol, the participants first construct a unanimous consent secret sharing scheme and then they share the random information chosen among other participants by using private secret sharing schemes. Ingemarsson and Simmons referred their schemes as "Democratic secret sharing schemes". Democratic secret sharing only permits the sharing of a "random" secret among the participants, whereas in a traditional secret sharing scheme the Dealer can share any secret he desires.
An important issue in the implementation of secret sharing schemes is the size of shares distributed to participants since the security of a system degrades as the amount of the information that must be kept secret increases. Recently, several papers studied this topic and both upper bounds and lower bounds on the size of the shares have been provided [4, 5, [8] [9] [10] 201 . In Ingemarsson and Simmons' proposals to implement democratic secret sharing schemes, the participants keep secret all the private information distributed by other participants. Consequently, so far, the main disadvantage of democratic secret sharing schemes, with respect to the schemes constructed by a Dealer, appeared to be the size of shares distributed to participants. In this paper, we show how to implement the Vector space construction due to Brickell [6] as a democratic secret sharing scheme. As a special case, we construct (k, n) threshold democratic schemes by using Shamir's method [15] . In our democratic secret sharing schemes the participants need no more information to be kept secret (shares) than they would need in the case where the schemes are constructed by a Dealer.
The vector space democratic construction
Let r # {9} be the access structure that the participants in 9 would like to realize and GF(q)' be the t-dimensional vector space over GF(q), where t > 2. Suppose there exists a function, known to all the participants,
where X denotes an undetermined participant not in B such that the following property is satisfied (1) the row vector $(X) can be expressed as a linear combination of the row vectors in the set {@(Pi): Pi E A} if and only if A is an authorized subset of the access structure r. To construct a democratic secret sharing scheme realizing r the participants in 9 proceed as follows.
(i) Each participant Pj in 9 chooses uniformly at random an element aj in GF(q). The secret is n S= 1 aj.
j=l
(ii) Each participant Pi in 9 chooses uniformly at random a row vector vi in GF(q) such that Ui = Vi.~(X), where "." IS the inner product in GF(q)'. Then, Pi gives the element Si. j = Vi. l//(Pj) t0 participant Pj, forj = 1, . . . , n. Indeed, each participant Pj is able to calculate his own share as
The properties of the described construction are summarized in the following lemma. where v,~_~, is a row vector in GF(q)' unknown to all the participants in A'. The best that the participants in A' can do to determine any information regarding the secret s is to consider the system of equations
for all Pj in A', and
Let d be the dimension of the subspace generated by the vectors II/( for all Pj in A'. Since property (1) holds, it results in d < t and, independently from the value of the secret s, both the coefficient matrix and the augmented matrix of the system of equations have rank d + 1. Therefore, for each possible secret s there are qtmd-l possible solutions for VP-A' and no information about s can be computed by the participants in A'. 0
Remark. As a simple consequence of Lemma 1 the participants in B can construct a (k, n) threshold democratic scheme, where k < n, as follows. The participants choose the elements aj and the secret s is defined in GF(q), where q > n, as in (i). Let ozl, . . . ,cln be distinct, nonnull elements in GF(q) known to all the participants. Each participant Pi in B chooses uniformly at random the elements ai, 1, . . . , ai,k _ 1 in GF(q). If qi(X) is the polynomial ai + ai.1~ + ... + ai,k-1~~-~, then Pi gives the element si,j = qi(aj) to participant Pj, for j = 1, . . . ,n. Indeed, each participant Pj is able to calculate his own share sj as in (ii). Let q(x) be the sum of polynomials qi(X)p for i = 1, . . . , n, over GF(q). The secret s of the scheme is the constant term of the polynomial q(x) that any k participants can calculate by interpolation [ll, 143.
